We consider the problem of choosing between rival statistical models that are nonnested in terms of their functional forms. We assess the ability of two tests, one parametric and one distribution-free, to discriminate between such models. Our monte carlo simulations demonstrate that both tests are, to varying degrees, able to discriminate between strategic and nonstrategic discrete choice models. The distribution-free test appears to have greater relative power in small samples. As an application, we consider the process of European Union enlargement and demonstrate that a strategic model captures this process better than a standard selection model.
Introduction
The empirical study of political science has, in the last ten years, undergone something akin to a sea-change. Where it was once common for political scientists to employ a linear functional form regardless of the theory being tested, we now see new attention being paid to the connection between theory and model (Morton 1999 , Signorino 1999 , Signorino and Yilmaz 2003 . The result of this attention has been an expansion in the number of different functional forms being employed by quantitative political scientists.
This increase in the number of modelling choices available to researchers has brought with it new challenges. For example, although Signorino (1999) demonstrates that traditional specifications of statistical models are generally inconsistent with strategic theories of political science, no rigorous framework has emerged for comparing strategic models against one another, or against nonstrategic models. While it is clear that strategic specifications provide different answers from traditional specifications, it not yet clear that these strategic specifications are, in fact, superior. We therefore need a procedure to determine whether one specification is "closer" than another specification to the data generating process (DGP).
A related problem stems from the fact that not all theory is detailed enough to allow the derivation of a functional form suitable for testing. An empirical researcher faced with choosing a statistical specification under these conditions needs guidance in choosing between the many functional forms, some strategic and some not, that may be used to model political phenomena.
In either of these cases, empirical researchers need tools that allow comparisons to be made between models with different functional forms. Such models, however, are generally nonnested (neither model is a special case of the other model).
1 Discriminating between nonnested models requires specialized tests that are rarely used in political science research. Clarke (2001) introduced the issue of nonnested testing to political science, and Clarke (2003a) introduced a simple distribution-free test for nonnested model discrimination. These articles, however, consider only models that are nonnested in terms of their covariates. Testing models that are nonnested in terms of their functional forms is a natural extension of this line of research.
The goals of this article are threefold. First, we briefly review the role of theory in determining the appropriate functional form of a discrete choice model. Second, we briefly review two non-nested model discrimination tests and demonstrate that discriminating between discrete choice models with different functional forms is possible, even with small samples. Third, we provide, with the help of an example from the literature, specific advice on how to determine whether or not a strategic specification fits the data better than a traditional specification.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present a common crisis scenario and consider three functional forms a researcher might choose 1 See Clarke (2001) for a technical definition of "nonnested."
2 when modelling it: a probit model, a selection model, and a strategic model.
The natural question is the extent to which we can discriminate between these models, given that the data are generated by a strategic process. We answer this question by conducting a monte carlo experiment that assesses the relative power of the Vuong and distribution-free tests. We find that both the Vuong and distribution-free tests are able to discriminate between the models accurately. In large samples, the two tests are essentially equivalent.
In small samples, however, the distribution-free test outperforms the Vuong test. Finally, we discuss an empirical example concerning European Union enlargement and provide specific advice for the researcher.
Competing Discrete Choice Models
Consider a researcher who wants to model the conditions under which two states are likely to go to war. Figure 1 displays the result.
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Although we have already imposed certain constraints on the conflict scenario, there remains a great deal of latitude for researchers who wish to model it. A simple point, but one that is often overlooked, is that the statistical model a researcher employs depends on his or her underlying theory of the process generating the data. Some researchers take an explicitly gametheoretic approach and derive their functional form directly from their model.
Others rely on the structure of the available data; researchers with binary data tend to use different statistical models than those researchers with sequential data. Given rival models that represent two different data generating processes, we need to be able to test which model is better supported by the data.
To make this point more concretely, we turn to three different models a re-2 The scenario could just as well represent an extended deterrence situation where state 1 is threatening to attack a protege of state 2. If the protege is attacked, state 2 must decide whether to defend its protege (see Huth 1988, Signorino and Tarar 2002) .
searcher might choose when empirically analyzing the conflict scenario in Figure 1 . We highlight these models as they appear throughout the international relations literature. We begin with a probit model, follow with a selection model, and end with the two variants (binary and sequential) of a strategic model.
Probit Model
Due to the widespread availability of binary data -and the commensurate dearth of sequential data -the most popular method of analyzing a conflict scenario such as in Figure 1 has been the probit or logit model.
3 Given this modelling choice, two of the outcomes in the conflict scenario, status quo (SQ) and capitulation by state 2 (Cap 2 ), are usually aggregated into a single outcome, the absence of war (¬W ar). 2's regressors, β and γ are coefficient vectors on X and Z, respectively, and is a random disturbance, assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance one.
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We do not observe the latent variable, y * W ar , but only whether the joint propensity is above or below the threshold for war,
Maximum likelihood estimation of the probit model is based on the resulting probabilities,
where Φ(·) is the distribution function of the standard normal.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we motivate the statistical models by making random utility assumptions, as opposed to relying on the structure of the data. It is important to note that probit models may also be motivated by random utility assumptions (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, Lutkepohl, and Lee 1985) .
In random utility models, decision-makers are assumed to have preferences over outcomes, which are represented by their utilities for those outcomes. Each decision-maker chooses the option available to her for which she has the highest utility. Because the empirical analyst does not fully observe the decision-makers' utilities, the analyst models each player's utility as having an observable component and a random component.
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It is doubtful that the probit version of the conflict scenario could be reasonably motivated by random utility assumptions. The analyst would need to make one of two assumptions: either (1) that states 1 and 2 jointly make a decision between W ar and ¬W ar; or, (2) that their individual actions somehow lead to either W ar or ¬W ar. Both assumptions have obvious theoretical problems, since both "black box" important components of the decision-making process. Under the first assumption, we must assume the existence of an unobserved decision aggregation rule that is consistent with considering the dyad as a single decision-making unit. Under the second assumption, we must assume an unobserved sequence of choices that are consistent with considering only the W ar versus ¬W ar outcomes. With that said, we turn to two models that can be more directly motivated by random utility assumptions.
Selection Model
Now consider a researcher who has sequential data on state 1's decision to attack and state 2's decision to resist after being attacked. One random 5 For examples of strategic and nonstrategic random utility models, see Signorino (2002) . 8 utility-based modelling option available to the researcher is the Heckman selection model, which has become increasingly popular in economics and in political science.
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The selection model displayed in Figure 2 (b) retains the original sequential choice structure depicted in Figure 1 . State 1 decides whether to attack or not based on a comparison of its utility for attacking, U 1 (A), with its utility for not attacking, U 1 (¬A). The "selection equation,"
represents state 1's net utility for attacking, where Xβ is the observable component of its utility and 1 is the random term. 7 As a utility maximizer, state 1 attacks when y * A > 0. We observe,
If state 1 attacks (i.e., y A = 1), then state 2 must decide whether to resist or not. Again, this decision is based on a comparison of state 2's utility for going to war versus capitulating. The "outcome equation," Reed (2000) , and Signorino (2002) . 7 Equation 3 represents the difference in state 1's utilities for attacking versus not attacking. Equivalently, if we normalize state 1's utility for the status quo to zero, then it represents its utility for attacking.
represents state 2's net utility for resisting, where Zγ is the observable component of its utility and 2 is the random term. As a utilty maximizer, state 2 resists whenever y * R > 0. We observe,
The final step in specifying the selection model concerns the disturbances, 1 and 2 . Following Greene (2003), we assume the disturbances are distributed bivariate normal with mean zero, variance one, and correlation ρ. Given these assumptions, the probability of observing each outcome is,
where Φ(·) and Φ 2 (·) are the c.d.f.'s of the standard normal and standard bivariate normal, respectively, and ρ is the correlation between the error terms for the two equations.
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Strategic Choice Model
A third modelling choice available to the researcher analyzing the conflict scenario is to assume that the choices both states make occur not only sequentially, but strategically. For example, in the selection model discussed in the previous section, state 1's decision to attack or not (Equation 3) is a linear function and does not take into account what state 2 is likely to do. In contrast, assume that state 1 chooses between the status quo and attacking state 2 taking into consideration whether it believes that state 2 will capitulate or choose war. Given that state 1 chooses to attack, state 2 then decides between capitulation and war based on a straightforward utility maximization. If attacked, state 2 must decide whether to resist (R) or not resist (¬R).
The payoffs to each state are given below the outcomes in Figure 2 (c). We normalize the status quo payoff for state 1 to zero. Whereas in the previous models we combined the factors that influenced state 1's decision into Xβ, we now separate them into (1) those that affect state 1's payoff for the capitulation outcome (X C β C ) and (2) those that affect state 1's payoff for the war outcome (X W β W ). As before, we normalize state 2's payoff for the status quo at zero, and we let its payoff for war be Zγ. We assume that a disturbance is associated with the expected utilities at each information set, and that the 11 disturbances are independently distributed standard normal.
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To derive the strategic probability model, we work "up the game," starting with state 2's decision. If attacked, state 2 considers only whether to resist or not. As in the selection model,
represents state 2's net utility for resisting. Zγ is the observable component of the utility, and 2 is the random term. As a utility maximizer, state 2 resists whenever y * R > 0. We observe,
Given the distributional assumption for 2 , state 2's choice probabilities are,
Now consider state 1's decision. As before, state 1's decision whether to attack is based on a comparison of its utility for attacking versus its utility for the status quo. In contrast to the selection model, however, we now assume that state 1 conditions its behavior on what it expects state 2 to do.
Because state 1 does not perfectly observe state 2's utilities, state 1 can only estimate the probability that state 2 will resist or not. Therefore, state 1's utility for attacking is an expected utility, based on the lottery representing whether state 2 will resist or not.
Since we normalize state 1's utility for the status quo to zero,
represents state 1's net expected utility for attacking.
is the observable component of the expected utility, and 1 is the random utility component. State 1 attack when y * A > 0. We observe,
State 1's equilibrium choice probabilities are then,
Because the disturbances are independently distributed, the equilibrium outcome probabilities are the product of the choice probabilities along the path,
Maximum likelihood estimation of the effect parameters, β C , β W , and γ, is based on these equilibrium probabilities assuming that the dependent variable denotes which of the three outcomes occurred for each observation.
A Binary Data Version of the Strategic Choice Model
The two discrimination tests discussed in the next section require that both rival models have precisely the same dependent variable. This requirement is problematic for researchers who wish to discriminate between the ubiquitous probit model and the more recent strategic model. The reason is that the strategic model has three outcomes, and the probit model has only two. The problem is easily solved, however. For a valid comparison of the two models, we simply need a version of the strategic model that has been aggregated for binary data.
Recall from Figures 1 and 2(a) that the binary data represent W ar versus ¬W ar. Where the probit model ignores the different outcomes that comprise ¬W ar, the strategic model forces us to confront them. Thus, the ¬W ar outcome, in the binary version of the strategic model, is equivalent to the occurrence of either the status quo (SQ) or capitulation (Cap 2 ). The probability of ¬W ar is therefore the probability of the status quo plus the probability of capitulation. The probabilities for the binary data version of the strategic model are then,
where the choice probabilities are those previously derived for the full strategic model. The W ar outcome is the same in both versions of the model, therefore, the probability of war is the same in both models. These probabilities form the basis for maximum likelihood estimation of the effect parameters given binary data.
Nonnested Model Testing
The models in Section 2 are nonnested in terms of their functional forms.
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Determining which of these functional forms is closest to the true, but unknown, specification requires the use of discrimination tests that are still new to the vast majority of political scientists. Two of the easiest and least contro-versial of these tests are the Vuong test (Vuong 1989 ) and a distribution-free test introduced by Clarke (2003a) .
Both tests are based on the Kullback-Leibler information criteria (Kullback and Leibler 1951) , which is simply a measure of similarity between an estimated model and the true distribution. We can write the Kullback-Liebler information criteria (KLIC) heuristically as
The point of the above equation is that we wish to choose the statistical model that minimizes the KLIC because that is the statistical model that is closest to the truth. Written more formally, the KLIC is
where h is the true conditional density of Y given X (the true, but unknown distribution), f is the statistical model, and E 0 is the expectation under the true distribution. Given that we wish to minimize the KLIC, we want to choose the model with the largest log-likelihoods, E 0 [ln f (Y|X; β)]. In other words, we should choose one statistical model over another statistical model if the individual log-likelihoods of that model are significantly larger than the individual log-likelihoods of the rival model. The difference between the two tests we discuss here is whether we consider the average difference in the log-likelihoods of two models or the median difference in the log-likelihoods of two models.
The Vuong Test
The Vuong test considers the average difference in the log-likelihoods of two competing statistical models. The null hypothesis of the test is that this average difference is zero. Letting f denote model 1, which has covariates X and coefficients β, and g denote model 2, which has covariates Z and coefficients γ, we can write the null as
The null hypothesis simply states that the two models are equally close to the true specification.
The expected value in the above hypothesis is unknown. Vuong demonstrates that under fairly general conditions that
where LR(β,γ) is the estimated difference in the log-likelihoods of the two
. Thus, the expected value can be consistently estimated by 1 n times the usual log-likelihood ratio statistic.
Suitably normalized, the test statistic is normally distributed under the null hypothesis, under H 0 :
where the estimated variance is computed in the usual way (sum of the squares minus square of the sums),
Thus, the test can be described in simple terms. If the null hypothesis is true, the average value of the log-likelihood ratio should be zero. If H f is true, the average value of the log-likelihood ratio should be significantly greater than zero. If the reverse is true, the average value of the log-likelihood ratio should be significantly less than zero.
The log-likelihoods used in the Vuong test are affected if the number of coefficients in the two models being estimated is different, and therefore the test must be corrected for the degrees of freedom. Vuong (1989) suggests using a correction that corresponds to either Akaike's (1973) information criteria or Schwarz's (1978) Bayesian information criteria. In the simulations that follow, we use the latter, making the adjusted statistic 10 ,
where p and q are the number of estimated coefficients in models f and g, respectively.
The Distribution-Free Test
Where the Vuong test considers the average difference in the log-likelihoods of two competing statistical models, the distribution-free test considers the median difference in the log-likelihoods of two competing statistical models (Clarke 2003a) . Thus, if the models are equally close to the truth, half of the individual log-likelihood ratios should be greater than zero and half should be less than zero. If model f is "better" than model g, more than half of the individual log-likelihood ratios should be greater than zero. Conversely, if model g is "better" than model f , more than half of the individual loglikelihood ratios should be less than zero.
The null hypothesis of the distribution-free test, therefore, is that if two models are equally close to the truth, half of the log-likelihood ratios should be great than zero,
where I is the indicator function. The test statistic, therefore, is simply the number of positive differences, and it is distributed Binomial with parameters n and θ = 0.5.
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One of the great strengths of this test is that implementation is remarkably simple; the test can be produced by any mainstream statistical software package using the following algorithm 12 :
1. Run model f , saving the individual log-likelihoods, 2. Run model g, saving the individual log-likelihoods,
where p and q are the number of estimated coefficients in models f and g, respectively. As we are working with the individual log-likelihood ratios, we cannot apply this correction to the "summed" log-likelihood ratio as we did for the Vuong test. We can, however, apply the average correction to the individual log-likelihood ratios. That is, we correct the individual loglikelihoods for model f by a factor of: p 2n ln n and the individual log-likelihoods for model g by a factor of:
A discussion of the efficiency of the distribution-free test versus the Vuong test as well as proofs of the consistency and unbiasedness of the distributionfree test are found in Clarke (2003b) .
Monte Carlo Simulations
We wish to determine if we can discriminate (1) between the strategic model and the selection model, and (2) 
Experimental Design
The data generating process (DGP) for the experiment is the strategic model.
The utilities for states 1 and 2 are specified as in Figure 2 (c) with the exception that each utility is now a function of a single variable denoted by x C ,
x W , and z. State 1's latent variable equation is thus,
and state 2's latent variable equation is
For each monte carlo replication, x C , x W , and z are drawn anew from uniform distributions with means of -0.5 and variances of one. 13 The stochastic components 1 and 2 are drawn anew from independent normal distributions with means of zero and variances of σ 2 . All coefficients, β C , β W , and γ, are set to 1.
The values taken by the two latent variables, y * A and y * R , determine the actions 13 Using uniform distributions with slightly negative means ensures that war is a relatively rare event in the simulated data. In this way, the data more closely approximate what we find in real-world applications.
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taken by both states in the simulated data. State 1 attacks when y * A > 0, and state 2 resists when y * R > 0. For each replication, two versions of the dependent variable are generated: one contains the actions of both states and the other is aggregated to war and no war as noted in Section 2.3.1. In this way, we can discriminate between the strategic and selection models and between the strategic and probit models using the same simulated independent variables and error terms.
The strategic, selection, and probit models are estimated for each generated data set. The specification of the strategic model matches the DGP. The selection model is specified with the following selection and outcome equations,
The z regressor is added to the selection equation in order that the model might stand a better chance of approximating the strategic DGP. 14 The probit model is specified as,
To compare the strategic model to the probit model, log-likelihoods for the strategic model are constructed using the estimated model's parameters and aggregating the probabilities appropriately as in Equations 8 and 9.
Our ability to discriminate between these rival models is likely to depend upon the size of the sample and the "signal-to-noise ratio" of the DGP (the ratio of the variance of the systematic portion of the DGP to the variance of the error term). Discrimination should be easier as both the size of the sample and as the "signal-to-noise ratio" increase. To assess these effects, we varied the size of the sample between 50 and 500, and varied the "signalto-noise ratio" by changing the error variance between 0.5 and 2.0. 8000 replications are performed.
The following summarizes the experiments:
• Data generating process: strategic (all coefficients set to 1),
• Sample sizes: N ∈ {50, 100, 200, 300, 500},
• Error variance: σ ∈ {.5, 1, 2},
• Comparisons: probit v. strategic, selection v. strategic 15 ,
• Tests: Vuong and distribution-free,
• Replications: 8000.
In total, the results of 15 simulations are reported.
The experimental design raises two interesting issues. First, given the design of the simulations, we cannot discuss the size of the tests because the null hypothesis is false in every experiment (the models are never equally close to the true DGP). Rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true is therefore not possible. We can, however, discuss the power of the tests in both the correct direction (toward the strategic model) and the wrong direction (away from the strategic model). Note that this latter category includes not only picking the wrong model, but also picking neither model.
Second, we are comparing a continuous test statistic, the Vuong, with a discrete test statistic, the number of positive differences. The problem with this comparison is that for any finite number of observations, the exact significance level of the discrete test statistic is unlikely to match the nominal significance level selected for the simulation. For example, we would like to assess the statistics based on a .05 significance level. However, the discrete test statistic has a limited number of probabilities (the number of "jump points" in the c.d.f.) that can serve as α. Absent identical exact significance levels, power comparisons may be quite misleading (Gibbons and Chakraborti 1992) .
One way to avoid this problem is to employ a randomized decision rule (Lehmann 1986 ). However, as DeGroot (1989) points out, it seems odd for a researcher to decide which hypothesis to accept by tossing a coin or using some other method of randomization. In place of a randomized procedure, then, we chose critical values for the Vuong test such that the significance level of the Vuong would match the exact significance level of the distribution-free test for the desired α. For example, with a sample size of 200, there is no critical value for the binomial that will produce a significance level of .05.
Using 58 as a critical value produces a significance level of .0666. The appropriate critical value for the Vuong test, then, is one that also produces a significance level of .0666, which in this case, is 1.5015606. The power levels we report, therefore, are for equivalent nominal and exact significance levels.
Results
The results for the discrimination of the strategic model against the selection model are displayed in Table 1 , and the results for the discrimination of the binary strategic model against the probit model are shown in Table 2 . Each shown for sample sizes ranging from 50 to 500 and for disturbance standard deviations of .5, 1, and 2.
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that both tests are able to discriminate between the models, depending on the sample size and signal-to-noise ratio. In general, the power of both tests increases as the sample size increases and as the signal-to-noise ratio increases. The former is not surprising as both tests are consistent and will choose the correct model more often for larger sample sizes. The latter is hardly surprising as the discrimination tests perform better in the absence of noise.
The tests perform at their worst when the sample size is small (N=50) and the uncertainty is large (σ = 2). In this situation, the distribution-free test correctly selects the strategic model 72.8% of the time, while the Vuong test correctly selects the strategic model 68.8% of the time. The results are even less impressive when we turn to the binary model comparison. Here, the distribution-free test has a slightly higher probability of choosing the wrong model, while the Vuong test, on the other hand, has a slightly higher probability of choosing neither model. We believe that the benefits gained from the greater power of the distribution-free test outweigh the slightly higher probability of rejecting the null in favor of the incorrect model.
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The simulation results should be of great interest to substantive scholars. The results are important in that small sample studies, though not the majority, are common in international relations research. For example, seven recent small-n studies in conflict studies are Huth (1988) , which has an n of 58; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) , which has an n of 97; Reiter and Stam (1998) , which has an n of 197; Signorino and Tarar (2002) , which has an n of 58; Bennett and Stam (1996) , which has an n of 169; Benoit (1996) , which has an n of 97; and Pollins (1996) , which has an n of 161. A test that works under conditions where is discrimination is difficult is surely welcome.
17 See Clarke (2003b) for a formal comparison of the trade-offs between these errors.
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In their recent article on European Union (EU) eastern enlargement, Plümper, Schneider, and Troeger (2006) break new ground by treating enlargement as two interrelated decisions. In the first stage, the governments of transition states choose whether or not to apply for membership, and in the second stage, the EU decides whether or not to accept these applications. The authors state that the presence of the selection mechanism calls for the use of a Heckman selection model arguing that "the procedure not only captures our theory appropriately, it is also more efficient and robust than competing procedures and -most importantly -the only consistent estimator given the truncated distribution of the sample in the second stage" (Plümper et al. 2006, 24) .
Does the Heckman selection model appropriately capture Plümper et al.'s theory? The authors argue that the application and the accession stages are "intertwined" and interdependent [18] . They also argue that leaders of autocratic regimes are unwilling to apply for EU membership because, among other reasons, "they anticipated little or no chance for success" [18] . This suggests that the decision to apply for EU membership is strategic. If so, then, as we argued in Section 2.3, the Heckman selection model does not appropriately capture the theory.
Using the methods discussed in Section 3, we can test whether or not the decision to apply for EU membership is strategic. The two competing models 
are depicted in Figure 3 (compare with panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2 ). In the top panel of Figure 3 , the transitioning government makes the decision to apply for EU membership or not. This decision would be made, as suggested by Plümper et al. [21] , for purely domestic reasons, and the likely decision by the EU is not a factor. In the bottom panel of Figure 3 , the transitioning government makes the decision to apply for EU membership based partly on what the government believes the EU's decision will be. Which model is closer to the DGP, therefore, has considerable theoretical bite.
We replicate Plümper et al.'s model 3 (their full model) in Table 3 . 18 The dependent variable is binary taking a value of 1 if a state applies for membership in the EU. The independent variables in this stage include a measure of regulatory quality, the Polity IV proxy for the level of democracy, a measure of the dependence of the government on presidential intervention, exports of goods and services (per cent of GDP), and government consumption expenditure (per cent of GDP).
The dependent variable in the second stage is also binary and takes a value of 1 if a state has been selected for accession. In the second stage, the 18 Our replication is based on 98 observations, not the 169 observations used by Plümper et al. The reason for this discrepancy is the amount of missing data in the variables used for the EU utilities. Unlike the selection model, where the two equations are essentially estimated separately, the strategic model uses the variables in the EU utilities to create the probabilities that weight the choice between status quo and applying. The three variables that comprise the EU utilities-chapters completed, the power of eurosceptic parties, and the total size of the agricultural sector-include significant amounts of missing data. Thus, the weighting probabilities have a significant amount of missing data, and we end up with 98 observations. We ran the selection model with 98 observations, therefore, to ensure comparability with the strategic model. A few variables are no longer significant, but no major inferences are affected. authors "focus on the effect of political variables providing EU members with information on the political preferences of parties in the applicants' parliaments" (Plümper et al. 2006, 25) . The independent variables therefore include the number of closed chapters in the negotiations and the strength of Eurosceptic parties. Finally, the authors include the total size of the agricultural sector as a proxy for "the expected redistribution of agricultural subsidies once applicants are accepted" [26] .
In Table 4 , we present a strategic version of EU enlargement. One question that arises is how to apportion to independent variables in the first stage of the selection model between the three government utilities (status quo, application rejected, application accepted) in the strategic model. Our reasoning is quite straightforward. Reforms must be carried out before the admission decision; thus, they are sunk costs that do not depend on whether the EU admits the state or not. Hence, regulatory quality and regime type should affect the status quo utility of the government. We normalize the payoff to the government for "application rejected" to only a constant. The other independent variables are included in the acceptance utility for the government. For the EU's utilities, we normalize the payoff for "application rejected" to zero and enter the independent variables into the EU's utility for "application accepted."
Comparing the log-likelihoods from Tables 3 and 4 , we see that the strategic model appears to fit better, although we do not know whether this difference is meaningful or not. To answer that question, we apply the nonnested tests from Section 3. These results are in Table 5 . The results of the tests leave no room for ambiguity; both tests reject the null hypothesis of equality in favor of the strategic model. Thus, we can be confident that when states decide to apply for EU membership, they pay attention not solely to domestic political concerns, but also to the anticipated decision of the EU itself.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that discrimination between discrete choice models with different functional forms is possible, even with 35 small samples. We provide a framework in which it is possible to compare strategic models to nonstrategic alternatives, or even strategic models against one another. At the same time, we extend nonnested model testing in political science to situations where the rival models are nonnested in terms of their functional forms.
We demonstrate that discriminating between strategic choice models and various alternative nonstrategic choice models is feasible even under adverse conditions. While the distribution-free test has greater relative power in many of the experiments, both tests perform well and are easy to implement.
There is therefore no reason why a substantively-oriented scholar should need to simply assume whether or not that functional form is strategic. In our application, we demonstrate that the two-stage process of EU enlargement is indeed strategic. We hope that future scholars will use these results and techniques for increasingly rigorous comparative model testing.
